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ONE APPROACH, TWO RESULTS
The French Army, the U.S. Marines, and the Frontal Assault  
during the World Wars
Ethan S. Rafuse
 In the past few decades, students of military affairs have looked repeatedly to the first half of the twentieth century, and the efforts of military organizations 
to adapt to the changing tools of war during and between the two world wars, 
to understand why some military organizations are successful on the battlefield 
and others are not. It is safe to say that few, if any, military organizations have 
fared worse at the hands of students of the interwar period than the French army. 
This is not surprising. The disastrous 1940 campaign seemed to offer a compel-
ling verdict on the contrasting approaches that French military institutions and 
their German counterparts took to develop uses for the military tools that were 
introduced in the previous war. In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps traditionally 
has received high marks for its efforts during the interwar period. This, too, is 
not surprising, as its solution to the problem of how to make a successful opposed 
amphibious landing was a key contribution to the U.S. victory over imperial 
Japan.1
What follows is another look at the innovation efforts that the French army 
and the U.S. Marines made during the interwar period and the methods they 
brought to the World War II battlefield and the particular problems they faced. 
There is little doubt that there were significant dif-
ferences both in their organizational approaches to 
these problems and in the results those approaches 
achieved on the battlefield. To be sure, the starting 
point for assessing any military organization must 
be its effectiveness on the battlefield. Yet closer 
examination of the problems each faced and the 
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answers they developed reveals more in common between the French army and 
the Marines than the operational results they achieved suggest, and offers a com-
pelling reminder when studying the past to heed Sir Michael Howard’s famous 
admonition to do so in width, depth, and context.2 It is not the intent of this ar-
ticle either to deny the Marines their well-merited laurels by association with the 
defeated French army, or to ignore the serious issues with the latter that make it 
a useful subject for considering undesirable qualities in a military organization. 
Still, there is a danger that making battlefield outcomes the sole determinant of 
how we assess military organizations can lead to insufficient appreciation of con-
text, contingency, and detail, and thus an incomplete understanding.
BREAKING THROUGH THE TRENCHES
Of course, the military organizations that prepared for and fought the Second 
World War did so with the Great War’s oppressively heavy shadow cast over near-
ly everything they did. The problems illustrated by the tactical and operational 
stalemate that prevailed on the western front for most of the war, and its eventual 
resolution, weighed most heavily. When the western front consolidated at the end 
of the dramatic maneuvers of 1914, the French army and its British and Belgian 
allies had fended off defeat but faced what proved to be a formidable task—that 
is, driving the German army off the soil of France and Belgium before the strain 
and hardship of their societies’ near-complete mobilization for the war became 
unsustainable.3 With the German flanks effectively secured by the mountainous 
Swiss border and the English Channel, turning movements and envelopments 
were unfeasible. Consequently, the French had to figure out how to conduct suc-
cessful frontal assaults on fortified enemy positions that would create a tactical 
penetration deep and broad enough to be exploited operationally. The means 
available to French commanders were effectively limited to artillery and infantry; 
new technologies such as the tank and airplane were too immature to play more 
than a supporting role. This simplified their operational problem considerably 
and made the solution rather obvious: use artillery to smash the enemy’s lines, 
then send foot soldiers “over the top” to cross the deadly ground and attack the 
enemy’s lines. They hoped that the artillery bombardment would weaken the de-
fenders sufficiently that the attackers could find a hole in the line or, with effort, 
create one that was large enough for a complete penetration to be accomplished, 
which would set the stage for a full tactical and operational exploitation.4
If the concept was simple enough, successful execution was another thing 
altogether. The problem was not that artillery was incapable of creating condi-
tions for a tactical penetration. From the time the method first was applied, the 
French and their allies demonstrated that, while crossing no-man’s-land was 
costly, afterward infantry usually could find the enemy sufficiently weakened 
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by the preliminary bombardment to achieve a tactical penetration—a “break-
in” that gave the Allies possession of part of the enemy line. The problem was 
sustaining the assault’s momentum to turn the penetration into a breakthrough. 
In essence, once a penetration had been created, the two sides found themselves 
in a race. With the assault force exhausted and bloodied by the effort of creating 
the penetration, the tactical commander then had to send reserves up in the right 
place to exploit the breach before the tactical defender could bring up his own 
reserves to contain it and launch a counterattack. It was exceedingly difficult for 
an attacker on the western front to win this race. It invariably took more time 
for reports of a successful penetration to reach the headquarters of the attacking 
commander than it did to reach the defender’s, who also would have been alerted 
by the attacker’s bombardments to begin moving up reserves. Any penetration 
site was necessarily in range of the defender’s artillery and the high density of 
manpower and infrastructure on the western front meant that the attacker’s own 
artillery support was less effective the farther he advanced. The defender’s rear 
area also was usually better ground over which to move reserve forces than was 
the artillery-chewed expanse of no-man’s-land that attacking reserves had to 
cross.5 The French and their allies made notable improvements and refinements 
to the type and employment of their artillery, such as the development of the roll-
ing barrage, that forced the Germans to make fundamental changes to their de-
fensive tactics; however, they remained unable to turn tactical penetrations into 
tactical breakthroughs that could be exploited to achieve operational success.6
By 1916, a growing number of commanders concluded that the problems 
associated with the frontal assault in the face of modern firepower meant that 
efforts to achieve an operational breakthrough were not realistic. Even French 
commander Joseph Joffre, who had been an enthusiastic supporter of offensive 
operations early on, accepted the merit of this argument, albeit reluctantly.7 
Improvements in artillery and infantry techniques kindled hopes for a break-
through after tactical successes at the Somme and Verdun in 1916. However, the 
Germans then developed the defense-in-depth concept in response, negating 
those offensive innovations and leading to the catastrophe of the Allies’ Nivelle 
offensive in April 1917. After that failure, Philippe Pétain, who had been skeptical 
of pursuing breakthroughs since the beginning of the war, became head of the 
French army and brought, in the words of historian Douglas Porch, “a sobering 
note of reality to . . . operations.”8
Pétain advocated what some referred to as a “bite and hold” approach. Heavy 
artillery was employed as before, leveraging refinements in both tools and 
techniques, to saturate and destroy as much of the enemy front line as possible. 
Infantry then went over the top, with a rolling barrage preceding its advance. 
This necessitated a tightly planned, phased advance over a broad front, and 
3
Rafuse: One Approach, Two Results—The French Army, the U.S. Marines, and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 1 1 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
the discretion granted to lower-level commanders was circumscribed tightly to 
ensure that troop movement was coordinated with the barrage. This enabled 
enough men to reach the enemy lines to achieve a tactical penetration. Unlike 
before, though, the idea of exploitation was eschewed, so once the enemy lines 
were seized there was no “race” to expand the penetration or bring up reserves. 
In line with plans developed by higher headquarters, the infantry then would 
halt and, instead of attempting to turn the penetration into a breakthrough, 
would stay under the cover of its own artillery and repel enemy counterattacks. 
The infantry would consolidate its new position while heavy artillery was moved 
forward. “The artillery conquers the positions,” Pétain famously explained, “the 
infantry occupies them.”9
The effectiveness of these tactics was hard to dispute. By the end of 1916, 
improvements in heavy artillery enabled attackers to inflict unsustainable de-
struction on defending troops packed in forward defensive lines. This led to sig-
nificant reductions in the number of troops holding forward defensive positions, 
which made tactical penetrations all the more achievable. Under Pétain, the 
French successfully resumed offensive operations in late 1917, providing a much-
needed boost to morale in the French ranks following the mutinies that broke 
out after the failed Nivelle offensive.10 In 1918, these methods were incorporated 
into a broader offensive approach by conducting a series of limited and methodi-
cal operations at one point along the German line before moving on to another. 
While tanks and aircraft played a role in these operations, it was improvements 
in the efficiency and effectiveness of artillery, and its liberal use, that were “the 
true artisan of victory,” in Hew Strachan’s words. In the process of methodically 
pushing the enemy back—while also conserving French manpower—these op-
erations imposed enough casualties on an exhausted German army that its lead-
ers had no choice but to throw in the towel in November 1918. Thus, the French 
were able to claim victory at the end of the war, not through the dramatic blows 
on the battlefield envisioned at its start, but by exhausting the enemy through the 
accumulation of numerous limited tactical gains over time.11
INTERWAR DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT IN  
FRANCE AND GERMANY
Despite their success in World War I, there were significant issues with France’s 
methodical tactics. First, these methods do not produce quick, dramatic, or deci-
sive battlefield results. Consequently, they could not be employed by a belligerent 
whose strategic and operational situation required a quick battlefield decision. 
The differences in the broader strategic contexts in which France and Germany 
found themselves thus drove divergent doctrine development models in the lead-
up to the next war.
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France Commits to the Bataille Conduit
As Robert A. Doughty and other historians have chronicled, France’s methods 
also contained the seeds of a problematic military culture and a faulty approach 
to innovation during the interwar period that translated into disaster for the 
French in 1940. During the 1920s, French doctrine anchored itself to “the bataille 
conduit, or methodical battle,” which “resembled the methods used in World War 
I, but it represented an intensification of those methods,” “a step-by-step battle 
in which units obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly 
scheduled timetables. . . . [A]rtillery provided the momentum and the rhythm 
for the attack.” Infantry was expected to make only relatively shallow advances “to 
remain under the umbrella of artillery protection.”12 Whatever the merits of these 
tactics, there is no dispute that they had significant ramifications for the culture 
of the army that adopted them. By their nature, they required a very top-down 
approach to tactical planning and battlefield execution, as the employment of 
infantry and artillery had to be tightly coordinated, and plans had to be followed 
as close to the letter as possible, leaving little room for lower-level initiative.13
In service of this doctrine, French leaders systematically purged the aggres-
sive and audacious spirit of Napoléon from the minds of their officers in favor of 
“rigid centralization and strict obedience,” and thereby undermined their ability 
to respond effectively to unexpected developments on the battlefield.14 It also 
led the French to take flawed approaches to the study of World War I and the 
possible employment of armor. Focusing almost exclusively on operations that 
validated the methodical battle doctrine, they failed to recognize new possibili-
ties suggested by the war and improvements in air and armor technology. They 
tied tanks and infantry to the use of firepower rather than empowering them to 
exploit tactical penetrations dynamically and aggressively on their own. Further-
more, the hierarchical, top-down culture fostered by the methodical battle doc-
trine had the effect of discouraging open discussion of new ideas and concepts, 
especially in the country’s institutions of professional military education, which 
became little more than inculcators of doctrine. This precluded the sort of hon-
est, realistic consideration of doctrine and organizational agility that might have 
enabled the French army to recognize and address problems in its planning and 
execution of operations in 1940 more quickly. “France committed the glaring 
mistake,” Doughty concludes, “of trying to impose her way of war on the enemy 
without having suitable recourse should this attempt fail. . . . The notion of a care-
fully controlled and tightly centralized battle belonged to another era.”15
Germany’s Dynamic Response
Further damaging “bite and hold” tactics in the eyes of historians is the contrasting 
and more dramatic approach that the German army took to tactical innovation 
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during and after World War I. By late 1917, German resources had been exhausted 
to the point that it was impractical for army leaders to follow the French approach 
of relying on large amounts of heavy artillery and methodical operations. More-
over, the need for a dramatic victory before American matériel and manpower 
irreversibly tipped the scales against them on the western front meant that any 
approach that could not achieve a tactical and operational breakthrough was 
inadequate to Germany’s strategic needs. The result of German efforts to address 
the problem was the infiltration tactics of 1918, which also laid the foundation for 
the army’s doctrinal and organizational development during the interwar period 
and were directly connected to the victory of 1940.16
The fundamental issue, as noted earlier, was how to employ artillery and 
infantry to enable the attacker not just to achieve a penetration but to win the 
race between his effort to exploit and the defender’s effort to contain that tacti-
cal penetration. Instead of following the French massed artillery and infantry 
approach to wear down the enemy, the Germans applied speed and maneuver to 
the problem. Rather than pursuing destruction of enemy positions through heavy 
bombardments, German doctrine used short, concentrated bombardments 
with the objective of neutralizing defenders through disruption. This would 
be followed quickly by probes to identify weak points in the enemy defenses. 
Sturmtruppen (storm trooper—also called Stoßtruppen) assault units then would 
come up to maintain momentum against the assault’s preeminent objective 
and bypass strongpoints and pockets of resistance, push deep into the enemy 
position, and attack headquarters and rear areas. Sustaining the momentum of 
the advance and focusing more on the depth of attack than on maintaining a 
continuous line, in combination with the high tempo of the German advance, 
frustrated the ability of defenders to bring up reserves to contain penetrations by 
disrupting command and control. With command broken down and Germans in 
their rear, bypassed positions would be taken not through attritional battles but 
by the defenders concluding that further resistance was pointless and giving up 
the fight.17 In contrast with French methods, in which the artillery dictated the 
pace of advance, which produced an “entire system . . . designed to be propelled 
forward by pressure from above, rather than by being pulled from below,” the 
German tactical system dictated that the pace and direction of the battle be de-
termined by the efforts of the frontline infantry, with junior officers encouraged, 
indeed required, to exercise tactical initiative aggressively.18
The results of these methods when applied in the initial German offensives of 
1918 were impressive. With remarkable speed, German attacks achieved dramat-
ic penetrations of the enemy line and reached depths in Allied positions that had 
not been seen on the western front since the beginning of the war. Unfortunately 
for the Germans, while they had figured out how to break through the enemy 
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position fast enough to win the tactical race between the offense and defense, 
this simply meant that the race then shifted to the operational level, where they 
were less prepared. The Germans did not have the means to win this race, as the 
Allies were able to slow down and contain breakthroughs owing to their ability to 
bring up operational reserves and to the exhaustion of the German attack troops. 
The German effort was undermined further by the high command’s desire to 
maximize lower-level initiative at the expense of adequate planning to connect 
tactical successes to a larger operational framework.19
Although they ultimately failed to achieve a favorable operational or strategic 
decision in World War I, imperial Germany’s tactics have won praise from stu-
dents of military affairs, who believe they seeded Germany’s successful interwar 
innovation, which produced decisive victories in the opening campaigns of 
World War II and sustained high combat effectiveness throughout the war. The 
fact that they offered a qualitative approach and solution to the problem, in con-
trast to the more quantitative French methods, also contributed to their appeal 
to students of war, who generally have viewed strategies of attrition negatively, 
especially those in the United States who faced the challenge of countering Soviet 
mass on potential Cold War battlefields.20
Moreover, just as appealing as the tactical methods themselves is the process 
that the Germans used to approach the problem and how it shaped, and was 
shaped by, German military culture. In the process of developing doctrine dur-
ing the war and continuing to develop it afterward, the Germans demonstrated 
a salutary and impressive openness to ideas (even those that were not their own, 
as illustrated by their debt to concepts proposed by French junior officer André 
Laffargue). The German approach was characterized by a willingness to listen 
to frontline commanders, engage them in the process of doctrinal development, 
and encourage them to exercise aggressiveness and initiative on the battlefield. 
Thus, the Germany army went into the interwar period with a dynamic approach 
to doctrine, as well as an offensive mind-set that translated into a commitment to 
maneuver and the ruthless exploitation of battlefield opportunities, in contrast to 
the French, whom one scholar described as “frozen in time somewhere between 
Verdun and the autumn offensive of 1918.” Altogether, the German army’s ag-
gressive mind-set, in Williamson Murray’s words, “provided a solid framework 
for thinking” about the problems of the modern battlefield. This translated into 
the doctrine and organizational ethos that proved so deadly in 1939 and 1940.21 
Although infiltration tactics did not deliver operational or strategic victory in 
1918, the methods and the process by which the Germans developed and built on 
them during the interwar period and the dramatic results they produced on the 
battlefield have been lauded as manifestations of a “genius for war” that contrast-
ed conspicuously with their more insular and hidebound French counterparts.22
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THE AMPHIBIOUS PROBLEM AGAINST JAPAN
Western Europe was not the only place where the first half of the twentieth 
century saw militaries confronting the challenge of figuring out how to use the 
modern tools of industrial warfare effectively. As the United States contemplated 
the prospect of a military contest for the western Pacific—something strategists 
had been doing for decades by the time Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in Decem-
ber 1941—it was clear that it faced compelling and challenging problems. For a 
United States that sought to restrain and contain Japanese power in Asia, it was 
a question of how to project combat power across the world’s largest ocean. Of 
particular concern in this context was the task of securing possession of small is-
lands between Hawaii and mainland Asia so they could be used to support a drive 
across the Pacific by the U.S. Navy’s capital ships. The U.S. Marine Corps, partly 
as an act of organizational self-preservation, took up the challenge of figuring out 
a solution to one of the critical military problems confronting American strate-
gists: how to conduct successful amphibious attacks that would enable American 
forces to wrest control of those islands from the Japanese.
Few challenges appeared as formidable in the interwar period as making an 
opposed amphibious landing. If conducting a successful frontal assault on con-
tinental Europe seemed daunting in light of the experience of World War I, an 
opposed landing in the face of modern firepower to seize the small islands that the 
United States would need to defeat Japan seemed so hazardous that few were eager 
to take up the challenge. Although the first few decades of the twentieth century 
saw Western militaries conduct several successful amphibious operations, these 
largely validated, in historian Allan R. Millett’s words, “a similar basic concept for 
successful landings: land where there is no opposition from ground forces.” Mean-
while, the miserable, unsuccessful effort of the British and French at Gallipoli in 
1915 cast a dark shadow over the question of how to conduct amphibious opera-
tions against a beach defended by a belligerent equipped with modern firepower.23
However, the operational and strategic objective that amphibious operations 
were to serve—securing western Pacific islands to support the U.S. Navy’s of-
fensive drive toward Japan—was critical to American prospects for success. Of 
particular interest were islands that could serve as air bases to support the U.S. 
Navy’s capital ships against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the course of a grand 
naval offensive across the western Pacific toward Japan—islands that otherwise 
the Japanese would use to support their resistance against the American ad-
vance.24 The problem, of course, was that, while there were many islands between 
Hawaii and Japan, the need for islands that could support airfields narrowed the 
geographic options significantly, and it could be assumed safely that islands the 
American planners identified as operationally desirable also would be obvious to 
Japanese planners. Thus, the possibility that there would be islands of strategic 
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and operational value that remained unoccupied appeared slim. Moreover, many 
of these islands would be small enough, and offer so few practicable landing sites, 
that the most effective approach to amphibious operations—namely, landing 
where there will be no resistance—would not be available.
There were, to be sure, many problems unique to the opposed amphibious 
assault. “Moving men and equipment across open water in the face of carefully 
calculated fire is an extremely dangerous proposition,” historian Jerold E. Brown 
laconically notes. “Furthermore, the defender has the advantage of time and space 
. . . and he often has time to prepare his defenses.”25 On top of this were the head-
aches associated with coordinating land, sea, and air elements. In addition, since the 
United States would be conducting these operations as part of a massive strategic 
and operational exercise in power projection across the world’s greatest ocean, there 
were a host of logistical issues that were incomparable in both scale and character 
to what those charged with developing doctrine for the battlefields of Europe faced.
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that, in contrast to the travails of 
the French army, the story of how the U.S. Marine Corps solved the problems of 
opposed amphibious operations in the Pacific often has been cited by students 
of innovation as a great example of institutional effectiveness. In line with the 
concept for a war with Japan laid out in War Plan ORANGE, the visionary Marine 
commandant John A. Lejeune entrusted a young, somewhat eccentric, lieuten-
ant colonel named Earl “Pete” Ellis with the task of studying the theater of op-
erations. Ellis’s observations, laid out in Operation Plan 712 along with careful 
study of maneuvers conducted during the 1920s, then were incorporated into an 
effort to think critically about and develop doctrine—in contrast to the French 
schools, where the mission was to inculcate doctrine and “school solutions”—in 
which vital work was done by students and faculty at the Marine Corps schools 
at Quantico. Throughout, the Marines demonstrated the sort of commitment 
to rigorous professional military education; to entrusting critical tasks to junior 
officers such as Ellis and Majors Charles Barrett and DeWitt Peck; and to open, 
honest discussion of problems that was absent in the French army. The product 
of these efforts—more remarkable because the Marines simultaneously were 
analyzing their ongoing operations in the “Banana Wars,” producing the Small 
Wars Manual, which remains an invaluable work on the subject to this day—was 
the 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations.26
This document, officially adopted as doctrine by the U.S. Navy and distrib-
uted as Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP 167) in 1938, laid out the conceptual 
framework for addressing the problems of amphibious landings. After continu-
ing to refine the implementation of its concepts using the results of landing ex-
ercises, the Marine Corps took its amphibious doctrine to war. The first tests, at 
Guadalcanal and Tarawa in 1942 and 1943, although bloodier and tougher than 
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initially expected, validated the doctrine. They also validated the organizational 
approach and culture that produced that doctrine, especially the Marines’ pro-
cess of continual refinement as they conducted the grueling offensives that put 
American forces into position to bring about the total defeat of imperial Japan.27
Contributing to the contrast between history’s glowing judgment of the Marines 
and that of the French army is that, while there were many differences in the specif-
ics (French commanders did not have to devote attention to the merits of rubber 
landing craft or the construction of wharves, for instance), the fundamental prob-
lem the Marine Corps faced and addressed so successfully was in essence the same 
as the one the French army faced in Europe. Like the French and the Germans in 
World War I and during the interwar period, the Marines had to figure out how 
to combine fire and maneuver successfully to assault defenders equipped with 
modern firepower. The Marines’ success, of course, demonstrates the methods and 
qualities we associate with military organizations that innovate effectively, so one 
must think that surely their solution more closely followed the Germans’ aggressive 
maneuver doctrine than the French preference for mass, right?
Wrong. If the Marines demonstrated a more commendable (and Germanic) 
organizational ethos in the process of innovation, their solution to the amphibi-
ous assault problem was in fact more Gallic than Teutonic. Like the French doc-
trine of methodical battle, Marine doctrine placed heavy emphasis on firepower. 
In line with historical experience (not to mention common sense), FTP 167 
posited that, in light of the difficulties associated with landings, “superiority of 
force, particularly at the point of landing, is essential to success,” and that conse-
quently “[b]eaches strongly organized for defense should be avoided if possible.” 
In the event that an opposed landing could not be avoided, once an island had 
been selected for assault the U.S. Navy would endeavor to isolate it, to prevent the 
enemy from reinforcing it before, during, or in the aftermath of the assault. The 
“attacking force,” consisting of “two elements of major importance, namely—The 
landing force [and] Naval gunfire,” then would go to work.28
First, naval gunfire would pound the island. In its treatment of the effect 
sought, FTP 167 made a distinction between neutralization (“by short bursts of 
fire of great density to secure the advantage and effect of shock and surprise”) 
and destruction. The manual expressed a decided preference for the former, 
declaring, “Destruction should only be attempted under favorable conditions.” 
Once firepower had done its job, Marine infantry would make a frontal assault to 
break through the enemy’s defenses—not on a narrow front, with an eye toward 
infiltration and deep penetration, as in the German system, but on “a wide front 
in order to increase the speed of the landing,” avoid exposed flanks, and facilitate 
coordination with suppressive fire support ahead of the advancing infantry. Ma-
rine infantry would seize the enemy frontline positions that had been neutralized 
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by fire and then push far enough inland to secure the beach, while staying within 
the range of naval fire support. FTP 167 advised that “initial assault echelons 
are particularly apt to become disorganized during and immediately after the 
landing, and they cannot be expected to make deep penetrations against strong 
opposition,” which made it “often desirable . . . to have leading assault units se-
cure a limited objective.”29 On a small enough island, such as those that would be 
encountered initially in the drive across the Pacific from Pearl Harbor, anything 
beyond that would be unnecessary.
The Marines then would consolidate the positions they had gained, fighting 
off any enemy counterattacks attempting to dislodge them. Then, once the island 
or islands capable of supporting airfields were secured, the Navy would continue 
its westward advance to the next island chain. This way, U.S. forces would work 
their way methodically toward victory much as the Allies had on the western 
front in 1918. They would leverage superior resources to attack and seize one 
island chain, then another, attriting the Japanese armed forces as part of a larger 
strategy that, in cooperation with allies, also cut Japanese access to resources. 
Then, if the decisive naval engagement envisioned in both Japan’s “interception-
attrition” strategy and Plan ORANGE took place, the Japanese would be at a grave 
disadvantage. If not, the Japanese war effort in the western Pacific would collapse 
from the exhaustion of matériel and manpower.30
Of course, it is a truism that no plan, no matter how commendable the effort 
to produce it may be, survives first contact with the enemy, necessitating modi-
fication of the initial assumptions and plans. This was certainly the case for the 
Marines and their doctrine for an opposed amphibious landing, which first was 
tested truly in November 1943 in Operation GALVANIC, targeting the Gilbert Is-
lands. Planners identified wresting possession of Betio Island, the main island in 
the Tarawa atoll, from its five thousand Japanese defenders as the most important 
objective. For the most part, the Marines’ doctrine and the process that developed 
it were proved to be generally sound; however, the operation also demonstrated 
that they needed some modifications—ones that pushed Marine doctrine further 
in a Gallic direction.
As noted, the fire-support doctrine in FTP 167 preferred neutralization over 
destruction. Yet, as one Marine who landed at Tarawa later explained to an in-
terviewer for the World at War series, this was not what the landing teams were 
told to expect. “They thought they would level the island and completely demol-
ish everything,” he recalled, “[t]hat there wouldn’t be a living soul on the island.” 
Unfortunately, the Marines who made the initial assault found that, contrary to 
the boasts of some naval officers, this was not the case at all.31 Setting aside the 
stated preference in FTP 167 for neutralization over destruction, Colonel Merritt 
Edson, the Second Marine Division chief of staff, and Lieutenant Colonel David 
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Shoup, the commander of the initial assault force, developed a plan in which the 
assault on Betio would be preceded by several days of preparatory air and naval 
bombardment. Naval planners, however—afraid of leaving their vessels exposed 
in the event of an appearance by a significant Japanese naval force (as had hap-
pened in August 1942 at Guadalcanal, producing an embarrassing defeat at Savo 
Island)—refused to provide it. Instead, although there would be air and naval 
strikes for a few days before the actual attack, for the real work on the day of the 
assault warships would provide only a three-hour bombardment.32
Those who presumed that the use of artillery in a short bombardment for 
“neutralization,” along the lines of the German tactic, would be sufficient were 
badly mistaken.33 As the Marines began their assault, they were greeted with 
ferocious Japanese artillery and small-arms fire. The ordeal was made worse by 
the inability of the Higgins boats that many were using for the assault to cross the 
reef in front of the landing beaches, which compelled Marines to wade forward 
about six hundred yards under fire. Ultimately, enough Marines were able to 
reach shore to win the battle and secure the island—one that was not even three 
miles long and at no point was more than eight hundred yards across. However, 
even with a three-to-one manpower advantage it took American forces three days 
of brutal combat to eliminate Japanese resistance and claim victory—at a cost of 
over one thousand dead and more than two thousand wounded.34 Not surpris-
ingly, the heavy casualties suffered and the fact that the fight for Betio had been 
much, much tougher than expected provoked considerable discussion among 
Marine and Navy officers about how to improve their performance.35
“[N]ot the least” of the lessons learned, historians Benis Frank and Henry 
Shaw declare, “was the importance of naval gunfire.” Marine planners who had 
chafed at the limits the Navy had imposed on naval gunfire prior to the assault 
on Betio had been proved correct, and in the future it was accepted that “the 
preliminary bombardment had to be heavier and sustained for a longer period.”36 
If the difficulties at Tarawa were not to recur in future assaults and casualties 
were to be kept to an acceptable level, a few hours’ bombardment with an eye 
toward neutralization was not enough. “One of the great lessons learned about 
naval gunfire,” James Stockman observes in a 1947 study for the Marine Corps 
Historical Section, “was the need for destruction rather than neutralization. . . . 
[P]reparatory bombardment and shelling to be delivered on enemy-defended 
islands similar to Betio would have to be increased in duration and weight, all 
of this with an eye toward . . . total destruction.” After Tarawa, writes Joseph H. 
Alexander, perhaps the foremost modern scholar of Marine amphibious opera-
tions in the Pacific War, “[t]he duration and effectiveness of preliminary shell-
ing improved . . . but the Marines always wanted more.”37 That this lesson had 
been absorbed fully would be evident a few months later. When the Marines 
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conducted Operation FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands in early 1944, bombard-
ments would be longer (two days for the landing at Kwajalein Atoll, as compared 
with three hours at Tarawa) and heavier, with the effect that the landings were 
accomplished handily and the operation’s objectives attained much quicker than 
initial plans had anticipated.38
SIMILAR CONCEPTS, DIFFERENT RESULTS
Why were the Marines so “French” in their approach to assault tactics? The 
answer is, obviously, the similarity of the specific problems they faced. Wil-
liamson Murray identifies specificity—by which he means “the presence of a 
specific military problem the solution of which offered significant advantages to 
furthering the achievement of national strategy”—as one of the critical factors 
that contributed to success or failure in innovation during the interwar period.39 
First, like the French in their approach to the German problem, the U.S. Marine 
Corps did not have a compelling need to bring about a quick strategic decision 
in its contest with the Japanese. Both the French and the Marines faced an enemy 
that was inferior in resources—at least if the French fought as part of a coalition, 
which they correctly presumed would be the case. The presumption of matériel 
superiority would translate naturally into the ability to bring heavy firepower 
to the battlefield. In addition, unlike the Germans, for the French and the U.S. 
Marines a successful frontal assault was a tactically sufficient and satisfactory 
accomplishment, whereas the Germans needed tactical assaults to set the stage 
for operational exploitation.40 The small size of the islands the Marines first had 
to take in the drive across the Pacific envisioned by Plan ORANGE effectively 
eliminated the requirement for operational exploitation by the assault force.41 
Once the Marines seized the wrecked enemy front lines—and with the small size 
of those islands precluding the Japanese from using defense in depth to preserve 
manpower—they effectively had control of the island. The French army, bearing 
heavy scars from repeated failed efforts to translate tactical success into opera-
tional opportunity on the western front, and confident in its ability to prevail in 
a war of exhaustion, sought to deliver victory without the extraordinary costs 
that exploiting tactical penetrations produced. For all the success that the Ger-
man army’s infiltration tactics achieved in terms of territory gained, it came at a 
heavy price.
Interestingly, in a replay of what happened on the western front, improve-
ments in the fire support provided by the Marines and Navy for amphibious 
landings caused the Japanese to alter their tactics as the operational geography 
changed. As the fighting reached closer to the Asian mainland, the islands that 
the Marines needed to assault were much larger than the small atolls of the cen-
tral Pacific. Eschewing their earlier notion that the “enemy will be destroyed at 
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the beach,” and having been crushed under the weight of American firepower 
in the Marshalls, Japanese commanders took advantage of the larger islands on 
which they now were fighting to abandon the method of defending forward on 
the beach, where their men could not hope to maintain combat effectiveness un-
der the weight of USN gunfire.42 Instead, echoing the German shift to defense in 
depth after 1916, Japanese commanders at Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa pulled 
back from forward positions on the beaches to concentrate their defenses inland. 
Consequently, American forces found themselves facing limited resistance to 
their initial landings, only to face a murderous task as they pushed beyond the 
beaches. True to the pseudo-French methods they adopted, the Marines did not 
approach this task by aping German tactics, which relied heavily on an assump-
tion that disrupted defenders would surrender out of shock rather than fight to 
the death, and thus were ill suited for use against Japanese forces that were will-
ing to fight to the death. Instead, they relied on heavy firepower and methodical 
advances to grind down the Japanese defenders in grueling, murderous battles of 
attrition.43 Had such methods been briefed in 1934, it is not hard to imagine a far 
more friendly reception from a French audience than a German one.
Comparing the French army’s and U.S. Marines’ approaches to doctrinal develop-
ment offers a compelling reminder that the ultimate test for assessing military 
organizations’ approach to tactical problems is how well suited they were to the 
specific problem that particular military faced. It also underlines the need to be 
skeptical of overly simplistic conclusions about linear cause-and-effect relation-
ships among innovation, methods, and battlefield results. As Carl von Clausewitz 
noted when discussing the value of historical examples to guide how to think about 
problems, “If anyone lists a dozen defeats in which the losing side attacked with di-
vided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that very tactic was employed.” 
Unfortunately, he laments, a tendency to search for simple prescriptive lessons that 
results in insufficient attention to both the broader and the deeper contexts that 
shaped past events often has led to “superficial, irresponsible handling of history” 
that then produced “hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing.”44
Industrial-age firepower presented the military organizations that fought the 
world wars with the daunting challenge of figuring out how to employ firepower 
in ways that made it possible for offensive maneuver to secure tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic objectives at an acceptable cost. In assessing how well they 
addressed this problem, paying attention to context is critical. To paraphrase 
Clausewitz, while one can point to the French experience in 1940 as one case in 
which methodical, firepower-heavy tactics produced failure, one also can point to 
the experience of the Marines in the Pacific as an example where it produced suc-
cess. For that matter, General Matthew Ridgway successfully employed firepower 
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and methodical advances in Korea to attrit and exhaust the enemy rather than 
achieve a quick, decisive battlefield victory—the same strategic context in which 
the French and Marines developed their doctrines.45
France’s and Germany’s efforts to address the frontal-assault problem led them 
down different paths, to be sure, with the latter’s approach seeming to have re-
ceived unimpeachable validation in 1940. Yet looking at these organizations and 
their operations by comparing them with the efforts of the Marines complicates 
the picture, as does considering them in depth, as historians Robert Doughty 
and Williamson Murray have. Although critical in their assessments of French 
doctrine and institutions, in their accounts of the 1940 campaign Doughty and 
Murray identify an array of other factors—errors in operational planning, the 
by no means predetermined outcome of specific tactical events, and even plain 
luck—that must be weighed just as heavily as, if not more so than, doctrinal and 
institutional issues to explain the campaign’s course and outcome. In the process, 
they offer a strong reminder to be cautious in identifying cause-and-effect rela-
tionships when assessing innovation, since but for a different break here or there, 
firepower-heavy methodical operations may well have received validation from 
operations in both Europe and the Pacific.46
Of course, they did not. Nonetheless, while giving due weight to battlefield out-
comes, we must take care, to borrow from Dennis Showalter, not to approach the 
study of the military past in the spirit of Calvinist theology, “interpreting victory 
and defeat as judgments on the military righteous,” and assume that our task is 
merely to validate and catalog the virtues of the blessed and the sins of the fallen.47 
It is important not to let this all-too-frequent bias, or the understandable desire to 
identify concrete cause-and-effect relationships that can be applied to the process 
of innovation today, prevent us from taking full account of contingency, specific-
ity, and context in studying the past. After all, it is in considering and taking full 
account of all the factors that shape the course and outcomes of the efforts of 
military organizations in the past that Clausewitz places our best hope of avoiding 
“wrong ideas and bogus theorizing”—and their consequences—in the future.48
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